Introduction
Fundamental rights are -without doubt -an important element of the dialogue between the European Court of Justice (the 'ECJ') and the national courts, in particular the supreme and constitutional courts.
It would be at the same time very difficult to find a more complex aspect of this dialogue, given that the fundamental rights debate concentrates not only on the correct interpretation of law but also and first of all on the division of competences between European and national judges. The reason for potential disputes related to these questions is rather simple and almost self-evident: the ECJ as well as the national constitutional courts are the very guarantors of the respect of fundamental rights and that function is enshrined in the ethos of each supreme jurisdiction.
In this sense the competence with regard to fundamental rights necessarily imparts the legitimization of the constitutional status of supreme national jurisdictions. Today, almost 5 years later, we may say that the quality, scope and frequency of the application of fundamental rights essentially changed the face of the Court's jurisprudence. The ECJ has become the court of human rights for the European Union. How significant the impact of the formal act of including the Charter into the legal order of the EU would be on the whole EU legal system, was difficult to foresee.
Taking into account fundamental rights in the interpretation and application of EU norms is a crucial factor for the shaping of the legal order because it opens new ways of legal reasoning and methodology. It also allows judges to recognize more easily the purpose of certain legal mechanisms and their interdependency. For these reasons, no supreme jurisdiction, neither at the national nor at the supranational level, may execute their functions without referring to fundamental rights and to the general principles of law. My personal experiences confirm this assumption. As a former constitutional judge, I can firmly say that the openness towards fundamental rights protection and to the general principles of law were -at the first stage after the collapse of the communist system in my country -the very vehicle of transformation of the legal system. At the time they created substantive 'added values' to the concept of the rule of law. A similar impact of fundamental rights on the role of constitutional jurisprudence has also been observed in other national orders, where the totalitarian rule has paralyzed democratic development of society for many years (in Germany, Spain, Hungary, etc.). No doubt the application of fundamental rights standards was the most important aspect of the role which these jurisdictions played in the national systems.
As a European judge, I should assert that references to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the When fundamental rights protection is taken seriously, both at the European and at the national level, we are confronted with competing jurisdictions, each of them embodying their own ethos of fundamental rights scrutiny 9 . Being founded on the same axiological background, the constitutional values and those expressed by the Charter are very similar. However, this common source does not ensure uniformity of the Member States' constitutional standards. The differences reside not only in the content of a particular guarantee but also in a diverse hierarchy established between particular rights and freedoms. The approach to the relations between the right to privacy on the one hand and to the freedom of expression on the other hand, constitutes a perfect example. The limitations of these rights determined by the principle of proportionality are not the same in all national legal orders and The specific issues related to the application of the standards enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights ('ECHR') and the relations between ECJ and ECtHR after envisaged ratification of the European Convention by the European Union are not the subject of my analysis in this essay. The topic merits a separate presentation.
the scope of the admissible interferences with these rights depends on the axiological concepts accepted in a given national legal system.
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The European legal space is based on a pluralism of national legal systems, including a diversity of fundamental rights standards guaranteed by the constitutional provisions of each Member State. The idea of diversity is beautiful and at the same time very appealing because it allows -at least theoretically -to combine completely different components: on the one hand, the concept of a more and more integrated European space of law and, on the other hand, the national and constitutional identity of each Member State.
Nevertheless, diversity is not only extremely difficult to achieve in practice but also carries a risk to the coherence and effectiveness of EU law. A greater margin of autonomy allowing to shape the standards of basic rights protection seems more risky for the coherence and the effectiveness of the 
Possible scenarios
Theoretically, three different scenarios which describe the diverse approaches to the question of relations between the constitutional and the Charter standards of fundamental rights may be described.
The 'sense or non-sense' of the dialogue between the national and European jurisdictions has to be examined, because in each of these scenarios there appears to be a different degree of potential risk of collision and tensions between the different courts. The distinguishing criterion is the scope of application of the Charter in the field covered by national legal acts 15 which are in principle the subject of the national constitutional review.
A restrictive approach limits the application of the Charter to the national provisions which have been adopted specifically for the purposes of the implementation of EU law.
An abstract approach, completely opposite to the above mentioned one, extends the application of the Charter to each part of the national law which generally belongs to the legal field covered by the European provisions, however, no concrete connection between national and EU law can be identified 16 . As an example one could refer to the bulk of environmental law, agriculture or public health.
A functional approach, located half way between the restrictive and the abstract approach, constitutes a kind of compromise between these two. From the restrictive approach this concept differs insofar as it concerns not only the specific provisions adopted specifically for implementation purposes but also other national provisions, which are necessary to ensure an effective application of the European Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-279/09), above at (4). 18 Cf. Judgment in case McB. (C-400/10 PPU), above at (17) and in the case DEB v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-279/09), above at (4). 19 Cf. Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5). 20 Cf. the case-law cited in Åkerberg Fransson. At the same time it would not be right to see some essential, revolutionary change in the scope of application of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter in relation to the national regulations. The ECJ maintains a stance that, in accordance with its Art. 51, the application of the Charter always requires to establish which EU legal provision is applied and interpreted in the national legal order. Such requirements have not been met in case Siragusa (C-206/13), judgment of 6 March 2014, in which the ECJ declared its incompetence due to a lack of a sufficient linking point between EU law and Italian law concerning the landscape protection. This judgment is not a withdrawal from Åkerberg Fransson line but a confirmation of the criteria of the application of them Charter adopted therein. It must be recalled that this judgment has been adopted with regard to Swedish law, which was the legal basis for two procedures: criminal and administrative, initiated against Mr Åkerberg Fransson, who infringed the duty to pay VAT and in this context also committed a fraud. With regard to the two procedures related to the same facts, the ECJ interpreted the ne bis in idem principle, despite the fact that the national legal acts have not been adopted for the purpose of the implementation of EU law 21 .
The judgment expressly stresses that even national provisions adopted without any connection (direct or indirect) with EU law have to observe the Charter standards if they are to serve as national instruments in implementing European law 22 , and in that sense it's a clear example of the functional approach to the application of the Charter in the case law. The consequence of this approach is that a high number of national laws could be covered by a potential application of the Charter. In such a landscape, is there still space for a dialogue between the European and national jurisdictions?
It would be very hard to deny that the national legal acts which are potentially the subject of evaluation from the Charter perspective could also be the subject of the constitutional review from the point of view of application of fundamental rights. Is it not a kind of a specific 'dictate' of the Charter standards imposed by the principle of primacy of EU law which can marginalize the role of the Constitutional Courts in their sphere of activity thus depriving them of the most important part of their prerogatives, that is, the interpretation of the fundamental rights standards that are to be applied in the course of the constitutional review?
The approach stressing the exclusive application of the Charter standards of fundamental rights in such a situation seemed, before the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the only possible scenario.
From this perspective the importance of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment is significant because the space for the application of the national constitutional standards to the national provisions implementing EU law was expressly stated 23 . However, it does not concern all the potential situations (hypothesis) in which this specific overlap of the fundamental rights standards may appear.
Firstly, it may concern situations in which the European lawmaker has left a large margin of appreciation to the national legislators to shape adequate national instruments which are necessary for 21 Cf. Opinion of the Advocate General J. Kokott delivered on 15 December 2011 in the case Bonda (C-489/10) [2012] ECR, who stressed, that the notion of 'implementation' relates not only to the national acts which were adopted explicitly when the Member State implements EU law but also to the acts which already existed (see para. 20). 22 Cf. Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29). 23 Cf. Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29-30), reads as follows: "29. That said, where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by European Union law, implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised (…). 30. For this purpose, where national courts find it necessary to interpret the Charter they may, and in some cases must, make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU." the effective application of EU law. Exactly, such a situation occurred in the context of Swedish law in the Åkerberg Fransson case. EU law did not determine exhaustively the scope and the sanctions related to the responsibility for non-payment of VAT, imposing on the national lawmakers the duty to establish, in the framework of their own competence, the necessary legal acts including administrative or criminal procedures 24 .
Secondly, the application of the national constitutional standards becomes possible when the threefold condition is met that primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are observed. This solution seems to allow achieving two different goals at once, a wide application of the Charter on the one hand, and room for the Constitutional standards, on the other hand. This opens a potential dialogue between the national and European courts in this field. While this approach is very appealing, we cannot avoid addressing complex questions which arise in this matter and which show not only the positive effects of this concept but also some negative ones or, at least, complicated dilemmas.
These questions relate, as indicated above, to the area where the national and the Charter standards of fundamental rights may potentially overlap. We should recall that the mere existence in the national order of a standard of protection of a fundamental right which would be higher than that under EU law, does not in itself determine the choice in favor of the national guarantees 25 . The concept adopted in EU law in this regard 26 differs from the European Convention of Human Rights 27 , which automatically imposes the application of the higher standard of protection whenever there is competition between two standards, i.e. conventional and constitutional (national). The conditions mentioned in the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, necessary for the application of constitutional standards of fundamental rights, directly refer to the hypothesis in which a national standard was higher than the one adopted in EU law 28 . For this reason it must be asked whether not only the higher 24 A contrario, are not at issue national legal acts which constitute only a technical, necessary component of the legal rules contained in a EU legal act which decided upon all important elements of a given solution. 25 Cf. Judgment in case Melloni (C-399/11), above at (6), in which this option was definitively rejected (para. 63). The answer is only apparently simple and evident. These questions do not cause complications only in the 'ideal legal space'. Different constellations have to be considered, for instance that the national constitution ensures the same content of the guarantees, but sets up its own unique hierarchy in relation to other fundamental rights; that the scope of protection is the same but the proportionality principle applied in the national context allows deeper interference into fundamental rights than would be admissible on the basis of the EU provisions; finally, that the normative content of the rights is similar although some components of a particular right are differently applied in the constitutional and European jurisprudence. A good example is the ne bis in idem principle itself, because -being expressed in some legal systems in the identical formula -it is frequently differently interpreted in such substantive elements as the notions of 'penalty' or 'criminal procedure'. These few examples
show that perfect similarity, or even comparability, between the national and European level of protection is a hypothesis which is not easily attainable.
One thing seems to be uncontroversial: the level of protection in the national systems cannot be lower than the one guaranteed by the Charter. In this sense, even with the application of the national constitutional standards the Charter constitutes a very minimal level of protection which should be observed in all cases. But in reality even this thesis can face some of the above mentioned problems.
The approach adopted in recent ECJ jurisprudence has opened up a new perspective of coexistence between the national and European legal orders but it is not free from risk for the coherence and uniformity of the interpretation of fundamental rights in relation to EU provisions. However, it should be asked what its practical implications for the national judges could be. , the exchange between the ECJ and national judges has to be initiated -this initiative belongs to the national courts. Secondly, openness and sensitivity to the arguments provided by the other party of the dialogue is needed, the exchange between the European and national jurisdictions is not to be transformed into a 'one-way message' -this requirement should be addressed first of all to the European courts.
Mixed beauty of the constitutional identity
The disputes related to the possible coexistence between the national and the Charter standards of 32 The recent judgment in the case Digital Rights (joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12), judgment of 8 April 2014, on data retention by telecom companies, seems to illustrate that the analysis included in a judgment of a national constitutional court applying a fundamental right may precede an ECJ judgment. In the judgment on data retention the ECJ declared the EU directive invalid because it infringes the right to privacy. It was preceded by a judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which reviewed national regulations implementing EU law, which were found incompliant with the German Constitution (BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08 from 2.3.2010). It could also be noted that judgments of national courts referring to the protection of the right to privacy in the context of data processing by the Internet search engines (as for example the judgment by LG Hamburg in Mosley case; 24.1.2014 -324 O 264/11) preceded the ECJ judgment in case Google Spain and Google Inc. (C-131/12) above at (10). 33 Cf. case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29). 34 Cf. case Melloni (C-399/11), above at (6). Regarding the conditions for the applicability of constitutional standards, see also Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29).
It is worth recalling that the identification of 'constitutional traditions' as representing the 'constitutional identity' is an erroneous approach. Constitutional traditions of the Member States belong to the common heritage of European law and they are an essential component -as mentioned above -of the correct interpretation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. In this sense the 'constitutional identity' is a specific sublimation of the common constitutional axiology of the Member States which is one of the criteria used by the ECJ in its interpretation of the content of the constitutional standards which should be respected in EU law.
For these reasons Constitutional traditions do not equal constitutional identity. The former is a general and abstract concept being the synthesis of the trends in the legal systems of the Member States, whereas the latter is attributed to a specific legal system. The sources of the 'constitutional identity' are located in a normative idea of 'national identity' 35 . The national identity constitutes an 'added value' to the idea of constitutional traditions and only jointly they constitute the constitutional identity 36 .
There are certain crucial arguments in favour of respecting the specific constitutional values enshrined in the national legal systems. The European Union is created as a pluralistic organization and -as mentioned above -diversity is one of its strongest features 37 . Paradoxically, diversity in the EU is also the source of both strengths and weaknesses. time that the EU legal order, or rather the idea of integration itself is confronted with challenges which require a combination of the components which seem to be, by their own nature, in opposition.
However, it is an inherent feature of the EU legal space and the result of experience collected for over 60 years that an apparently non-existent solution may be found through dialogue because of the will and determination of all parties to find a consensus. The same mechanism shall be applied to the dispute between the 'constitutional identity' and the principle of primacy of EU law. The dialogue between national and European jurisdictions is a unique instrument in order to achieve consensus in this fragile matter.
The Court's jurisprudence has sent some signs which confirm that the idea of constitutional identity may be used as a ground for justification in the framework of the so-called derogation clauses. Even in the absence of any direct reference to constitutional identity, the Omega case 42 . The space to look for common points is therefore quite large and it is this aspect which provides for the strength and the sense of the judicial dialogue.
This ideal of a rational equilibrium will never be reached without a dialogue and a necessary degree of openness manifested by the parties of the debate. I strongly believe that the framework for this dialogue has been well determined by the values and axiology which are expressed by the formula of Article 2 TEU and which have been shared by all the courts participating in the debate. Instead of continuing a never ending debate about 'which court is the court of the last word', rationality requires focussing the debate on the real issues and, above all, on the question of what kind of European Union is needed in the future. 47 In this sense, it is sometimes debated whether the concept of constitutional identity of the European Union could provide a basis for the application of a 'reverse Solange-like' reasoning, which would delineate -with reference to national legal orders -the borders outside which national solutions would be an ultra vires form in respect to EU law. It would allow for an adequate reaction to the risk of authoritarian trends that might occur in some Member States. Cf. M. Kumm in a panel discussion: In the Era of legal pluralism. The relationship between the EU, national and international courts, and the interplay of the multiple sources of law, at FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, May 2014. Apart from the constitutional identity context, the supposition based on the assumption that each national legal system observes the fundamental rights, may be overturned. For example in the N.S. judgment, above at (3), the ECJ evaluated the practice of national authorities in the procedures applied to refugees. 48 Cf. also B. 
